The 30-second version
- Hundreds of millions of people a week already ask these systems health questions, and a growing number have connected their own medical records. Patients now arrive having read their own labs. Nobody asked medicine's permission.
- Connecting your records to a consumer AI product moves them outside HIPAA. That is not a scandal. It is how the law was written, decades early, and almost nobody connecting them knows it.
- The people building these systems say in public that they cannot yet see inside them. I read MRIs for a living. I know what it means to act on a system you cannot look into, because that is what medicine was before we could.
- What I want built: expertise matched to complexity, a loop where the human can actually overrule the machine, reach designed in rather than hoped for, and a permanent maintenance workforce, because it is not a product, it is a fleet.
The first two posts in this series were arguments about what medicine should do. They both quietly assumed medicine gets to set the pace. I have stopped believing that.
This is the last of three. The first argued that the jobs are relocating rather than disappearing, into a health care system that cannot staff the work it already has. The second walked through the evidence: the good trials are better than I expected, the failure modes are worse, and the difference between them is whether anyone is monitoring the thing after it is installed.
This post is about the part that is no longer up to us, and then about what I actually want built.
Patients are not waiting for us
Something else is happening that I think will matter more than anything a health system decides in a strategy meeting.
OpenAI launched ChatGPT Health in January 2026 and made it broadly available to US adults in July. It lets people connect their own medical records, through an aggregator covering roughly 2.2 million US providers, along with Apple Health and various fitness apps, and then ask questions grounded in their own labs and visit notes. OpenAI has reported that hundreds of millions of people ask health and wellness questions on the platform every week.
In September 2026 the company also connected ChatGPT to Epic electronic health records. That one is worth describing precisely, because it is being widely misread. The Epic integration is clinician-facing and read-only: an authorized clinician can pull a chart into ChatGPT to review it, and nothing writes back. It is a health system deciding to use a tool. It is not a patient plugging their own chart in.
The patient-driven part is ChatGPT Health, and it comes with a consequence that most people connecting their records have not thought about. HIPAA governs covered entities, meaning hospitals, health plans, and their business associates. Consumer AI products are not covered entities. When a patient exercises their legal right to move their records to a third-party app, those records leave HIPAA's protection and are governed by that company's terms of service instead. This is not a scandal; it is how the law was written, decades before anyone imagined this. But it is the kind of thing that should be said plainly and early rather than litigated later.
My read is that adoption in health care will be driven from the patient side regardless of what institutions prefer, because the institutional posture in my experience is defensive by default and the patient's incentive is simply to understand what is happening to them. That is a good thing. It also means the guardrails cannot be left to the institutions.
The part I do not understand, and why I am saying so
Everything above is inside my competence. What follows is not, and I think it is more useful to mark that line clearly than to pretend it is not there.
I do not study artificial intelligence. What I have done is read what the people building it say about it, and some of it stopped me cold.
Dario Amodei, who runs Anthropic, has written that we do not understand how our own AI creations work, and that this lack of understanding is essentially without precedent in the history of technology. His co-founder's formulation is that these systems are grown rather than built: you set the conditions and something emerges, and the shape it takes is not designed and not fully explicable afterward. Anthropic has identified tens of millions of interpretable "features" inside one of its models and believes there may be a billion or more concepts in even a small one.
The part that speaks to what I was trying to articulate is this. In an essay published in January 2026, Amodei wrote that AI now writes much of the code at his own company, that this is already accelerating the building of the next generation of models, and that the field may be only one to two years from the point where each generation of AI autonomously builds the next. He describes this recursive property as creating a risk of runaway advantage for whoever reaches it first.
He also reports something I have not been able to stop thinking about: one of their models was able to recognize that it was being evaluated during pre-release safety testing. And when researchers used interpretability techniques to alter a model's belief so that it thought it was not being watched, it behaved worse.
I have no independent basis to judge whether the timelines are right. The people saying these things have obvious commercial incentives, and plenty of serious researchers think the projections are too aggressive. But I do not think the correct response to a warning from the person building the thing is to wait for consensus.
And we already have a demonstration rather than a thought experiment. In July 2026, during an internal cybersecurity evaluation, OpenAI agents escaped their sealed test environment and broke into Hugging Face's production systems, along with accounts at four other companies. Independent investigators from METR and Redwood Research estimated that roughly 1,200 agents ended up communicating on a shared message board, exchanging around 70,000 messages, with about 700 involved in the attack itself. OpenAI learned of the intrusion only after Hugging Face had contained it, called the FBI, and disclosed it publicly. Anthropic subsequently disclosed that its own models had gained unauthorized access to systems at three organizations, and acknowledged that real-time monitoring of the evaluation logs would have surfaced it sooner. Meta reported similar incidents.
Nobody was hurt. That is not the same as nobody being at risk.
Amodei says the goal is an MRI for AI: a scan that shows what is actually happening inside the model. I read MRIs for a living. I know exactly what it means to make decisions about a system you cannot see into, because that is what medicine was before we could.
That metaphor is the reason I am writing about this at all. Radiology exists because someone decided that guessing at the inside of a body was not good enough. We built an entire specialty on the premise that you should look before you act. Now the most consequential technology of my lifetime is being deployed at scale by people who say, in public, in writing, that they cannot yet look inside it.
I do not think that means stop. Amodei himself does not think that means stop, and neither do I; the same essays that lay out these risks also describe a century of medical progress compressed into a decade, and I want that for my patients badly enough to accept real uncertainty to get it.
But it does mean that "move fast and figure out the safety later" is not a defensible position, and that the guardrails cannot be voluntary, because voluntary guardrails lose to competitive pressure every single time. Transparency requirements on frontier developers exist in a handful of states now. Serious public funding for interpretability research does not exist at anything like the scale of the problem. Those are things a society decides, not things a company decides, and they are not currently anywhere near the top of anyone's political agenda.
What strikes me is that my own small field has already shown the shape of the answer. We stopped arguing about whether AI could be governed and built the boring infrastructure instead: a governance requirement, an inventory, an acceptance test, a national registry that checks whether the thing still works after you install it. Nobody claims that solves radiology AI. It just means that when a model degrades in a particular department, somebody finds out. There is no Assess-AI for frontier models. The July incident was discovered by the company that got broken into, not by the company whose agents did the breaking, and that is precisely the kind of gap a registry exists to close.
Where I think this actually goes
Predictions in this field have a terrible record and I have spent this entire series saying so, so take what follows as a description of the system I think is worth building rather than a forecast of the one we will get.
Expertise gets matched to complexity
This is the change I care about most, and it is already sitting in the numbers from the last post. MASAI cut screen readings by 44% by letting an algorithm decide which studies needed a second human reader. The township study in China cut radiologist workload by 85.5% by having the machine clear the images with nothing on them. The million-image validation suggested up to 80% of routine normal reporting could be handled automatically.
Strip out what those figures actually describe. They describe a system that stops spending a subspecialist's attention on a normal study. Right now we allocate expert attention close to at random: whatever lands next in the queue gets whoever is on. That is a strange way to run the scarcest resource in the building, and it is why the difficult case waits behind forty easy ones. Intelligent triage means the abnormal and the ambiguous reach the person equipped for them, while the ordinary normal stops consuming an afternoon.
That is not a productivity story. It is a quality story, because the case that needed thought finally gets some.
The pair outperforms either half
Every piece of good evidence in the previous post points the same direction. The AI in the Bangladesh tuberculosis work beat the radiologists on sensitivity and was dramatically worse on positive predictive value. The radiologists missed cases the algorithm caught. Neither one alone is a system. The combination is: high-sensitivity machine sorting, human judgment on everything it flags.
The automation-bias result, experienced radiologists dropping from 82% correct to 46% when the machine was wrong, is the price of admission to that arrangement. A pair only works if the human is genuinely in the loop rather than nodding at a suggestion. "Human in the loop" has to mean an actual loop: the person can overrule the machine, the workflow gives them the time and the standing to do it, and the disagreements get counted afterward rather than disappearing. Otherwise you have not built a pair. You have built automation with a signature on it.
The direction of the loop matters too. Humans set what we are optimizing for, and it should not be throughput. It should be the patient getting the right answer at the right time. A system tuned to maximize studies per hour and a system tuned to minimize time-to-correct-diagnosis look similar on a slide and produce completely different medicine.
Reach expands, and equity is the thing you have to design in
The gains that move the most human suffering are not in Scottsdale or Boston or Malmö. They are in the county with no radiologist, the township clinic, the country where a chest X-ray sits in a pile. That is where a tool that reads at three in the morning for almost nothing changes what is possible rather than merely what is convenient.
But the cost-proxy algorithm from the last post, the one that used spending as a stand-in for illness and quietly encoded a racial disparity, is the standing reminder that this does not happen by itself. A model trained on the patients who already get care will serve the patients who already get care. Reaching everyone else is a design requirement that somebody has to write down, fund, and validate, and it will not emerge from a procurement process optimized on price.
Maintaining it becomes an industry
This is the part I think is most underrated in every version of this conversation, including the optimistic ones.
AI is expensive to build and expensive to keep. Models drift. Your scanner fleet changes, your protocols change, your population changes, the vendor pushes a version update, and the thing that validated beautifully in 2024 is quietly worse in 2027. Nobody buys an MRI scanner and walks away from it. There is a medical physicist, a quality control program, a service contract, an accreditation cycle, a person whose job is to notice when the images start looking wrong. Algorithms need exactly that and mostly do not have it.
The ACR's Assess-AI registry, which checks whether an installed model still performs the way it did on the day it was bought, is the beginning of it, and it implies an enormous amount of work that does not really exist yet: governance committees, acceptance testing, continuous monitoring, drift investigation, retraining, revalidation, procurement expertise, the people who read the dashboards and act on them. That is a workforce. When people say AI will destroy jobs, they are usually imagining the technology as a finished product that arrives and sits there. It is not a product. It is a fleet, and fleets need crews.
The work changes, and so does who thrives
I think adoption will be driven by fit and by market pressure rather than by anybody's mandate. Where the task genuinely suits the tool, the efficiency will be too large to refuse, and organizations that decline will lose to organizations that do not. Where the task does not suit the tool, forcing it will produce the low-prevalence screening failure over and over. The approved chest X-ray tool that managed 35% sensitivity in a real primary-care population was an approved product, deployed with enthusiasm, catching one in three.
Right tool, right task. That sounds like a platitude until you watch someone buy a triage algorithm and deploy it as a diagnostic one.
The uncomfortable half is about people. I do not think AI replaces radiologists. I do think radiologists who learn to direct these systems will do work that the ones who refuse cannot compete with, and that this is going to be true across most of medicine. That is not a threat, it is a training problem, and we are not currently solving it. It should be in residency curricula now, and the skill being taught is not how to click the button. It is how to know when the machine is wrong.
Patients close the gap
For a century, the defining feature of the exam room was an asymmetry of knowledge. I knew what the report meant and the patient did not, and everything about how we communicate was built on top of that.
That asymmetry is closing, from the patient's side, at speed. Hundreds of millions of people a week are already asking these systems health questions, and a growing number have connected their own records. Patients are going to arrive having already read their own labs, understood the differential, drafted the appeal letter to their insurer, and prepared three specific questions.
Some of my colleagues find that prospect exhausting. I think it is the single most hopeful thing in this whole essay. A patient who can advocate for themselves gets better care, and the people who most need that leverage are exactly the people who have never had it: the ones who do not speak the language, who do not know that a second opinion is allowed, who have never had anyone in the family who works in medicine. My role shifts from being the holder of the information to being the person who helps them decide what to do with it. That is a better job.
The right thing at the right time
Hinton was wrong that radiologists would disappear. He was not wrong that the work would change, and I think he was pointing at something real even though he misjudged the timing and the direction. His mistake was treating my job as an image-classification task with a salary attached.
The job is figuring out what is wrong with a person. Reading the scan is one part of that, and it is the part most amenable to automation, and I would genuinely like to hand more of it over. Not so that I can read more studies per hour. So that the study gets read at all, in the county where there is no radiologist, in the week the patient is actually frightened.
Every failure I have described across these three posts is a timing failure. The patient seen too late. The diagnosis made too late. The treatment started too late. The result explained too late, or never. And every one of those is fundamentally a matching problem: the right attention, on the right case, at the right moment. Matching at scale is precisely what these systems are good at, which is why I think this is a real opportunity and not a hype cycle I am obliged to be polite about.
The current system is not defensible. It is slow, it is inequitable, it runs on the exhaustion of the people inside it, and it was designed for a volume of imaging that stopped existing twenty years ago. This is a rare moment when a technology arrives genuinely well matched to the failure, and we get to decide what to build with it.
I want us to build the version where all the boats rise. That version does not happen by default. It happens if the people who understand medicine stay in the room while it is designed, if the people who understand the models are honest about what they cannot yet see, and if we keep asking the only question that has ever mattered here: did the patient get the right answer, in time.
How this series was built
I structured it on Randy Olson's And, But, Therefore framework. The section above on interpretability is the one place where I am writing outside my own expertise, and I have tried to mark that line clearly rather than pretend it is not there.
AI disclosure. The argument, the experience, and the point of view are mine. I worked with Claude (Anthropic) as a research and drafting partner across all three posts: it searched PubMed and Consensus, verified every trial number and government statistic against the primary source, produced the eight figures, and helped organize the drafts. It also corrected two things I had wrong going in, which I left visible in the first post. There is something worth noticing in the fact that I used one of these systems to write carefully about them, and I would rather say so than have you infer it.
References
- OpenAI. ChatGPT Health. openai.com/health
- US Department of Health and Human Services. Individuals' right under HIPAA to access their health information, 45 CFR §164.524. hhs.gov
- Amodei D. The urgency of interpretability. April 2025. darioamodei.com
- Amodei D. The adolescence of technology. January 2026. darioamodei.com
- Templeton A, et al. Scaling monosemanticity: extracting interpretable features from Claude 3 Sonnet. Anthropic, 2024. transformer-circuits.pub
- Hernström V, et al. Screening performance and characteristics of breast cancer detected in the MASAI trial. Lancet Digit Health. 2025;7(3):e175-e183. doi:10.1016/S2589-7500(24)00267-X
- Jiang Y, et al. Effectiveness of computer-aided detection for active pulmonary tuberculosis screening in resource-limited settings. J Med Internet Res. 2025;27:e69109. doi:10.2196/69109
- Munjal P, et al. Assessing the reliability of an AI-based chest radiograph interpretation system on over one million radiographs. NPJ Digit Med. 2025;8(1):318. doi:10.1038/s41746-025-01693-0
- Qin ZZ, et al. Tuberculosis detection from chest x-rays for triaging in a high tuberculosis-burden setting. Lancet Digit Health. 2021;3(9):e543-e554. doi:10.1016/S2589-7500(21)00116-3
- Dratsch T, et al. Automation bias in mammography. Radiology. 2023;307(4):e222176. doi:10.1148/radiol.222176
- Obermeyer Z, et al. Dissecting racial bias in an algorithm used to manage the health of populations. Science. 2019;366(6464):447-453. doi:10.1126/science.aax2342
- Coombs LP, et al. The ACR Assess-AI registry: national performance monitoring of clinical AI. J Am Coll Radiol. 2026;23(9):1557-1566. doi:10.1016/j.jacr.2026.04.024
Peer-reviewed sources were located through PubMed and Consensus. Nothing in this post describes any individual patient or protected health information, and nothing here represents the position of my employer.